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Abstract
This paper studies joint decisions on pricing and empty container repositioning in two-
depot shipping services with stochastic shipping demand. We formulate the problem as a
stochastic dynamic programming (DP) model. The exact DP may have a high-dimensional
state space due to in-transit containers. To cope with the curse of dimensionality, we develop
an approximate model where the number of in-transit containers on each vessel is approxi-
mated with a fixed container flow predetermined by solving a static version of the problem.
Moreover, we show that the approximate value function is L♮-concave, thereby characterizing
the structure of the optimal control policy for the approximate model. With the upper bound
obtained by solving the information relaxation-based dual of the exact DP, we numerically
show that the control policies generated from our approximate model are close to optimal
when transit times span multiple periods.
Key words: Empty container repositioning; dynamic pricing; Markov decision process;
L♮-concavity; approximate dynamic programming; duality.
1 Introduction
Transportation services usually feature demand imbalance in opposite directions, which in-
evitably leads to unbalanced allocations of empty equipment in different locations. In ocean
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container transport, the trade imbalance has been worsening in recent decades. Based on the
data from 2007 to 2012, Figure 1 shows how severe the trade imbalance is in the Europe-Asia and
transpacific shipping routes, two major connections for global supply chains. In order to meet
demand with sufficient empty containers in each service direction, ocean liners must redistribute
their capacities by repositioning empty containers: Besides laden containers, empty containers
must be moved from surplus areas to deficit areas. According to Fuller (2006), out of every 100
containers shipped from Asia to North America, 60 were sent back empty; on Asia-Europe routes,
41% went back to Asia empty. Furthermore, trade imbalance also has a significant impact on
freight rates. De Oliveira (2014) reports that trade imbalance is an important factor driving the
different freight rates for inward and outward journeys in a given itinerary. It is hence necessary
to develop an integrated framework incorporating both repositioning and pricing decisions, in
order to analyze their underlying interactions.
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Figure 1: Containerized trade demands (in million TEUs) on two major shipping routes from
2007 to 2011 (Source: Song and Dong, 2015)
In this paper, we develop a stochastic dynamic programming (DP) model for two-depot ship-
ping systems in which head-haul and back-haul shipping demands are random and endogenously
affected by freight rates. The control variables include repositioning quantities and the pric-
ing decisions for the voyages in both directions. In line with the literature on dynamic empty
container management (e.g., Song, 2007; Ng et al., 2012), we focus on shipping routes consist-
ing of two ports. According to Song (2007), among 1521 regular shipping services recorded by
Containerization International Online, 253 are two-port shuttle services. Moreover, the two-port
services can be considered as a macro-level approximation of intercontinental shipping services.
For instance, the ocean liners on trans-Pacific shipping lanes are mostly concerned about the
trade imbalance between two major geographic regions, i.e., Asia and North America. View-
ing each port as a region, one can still apply our model to manage trans-Pacific routes on an
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aggregate level.
When the transit time spans multiple periods, the exact DP model has to track the in-transit
containers on every vessel, leading to a high-dimensional state space. Thus, the exact model is
generally intractable due to the curse of dimensionality. To circumvent this difficulty, we develop
an approximate formulation which requires only three state variables, regardless of how long the
transit time is. The idea is to use some fixed number of in-transit containers to approximate
the value function. The fixed number can be predetermined as the optimal container flow in a
deterministic and static version of the problem.
Inspired by the recent applications of L♮-convexity/concavity in the inventory literature (e.g.,
Zipkin, 2008), we prove that the approximate value function is L♮-concave in a transformed
state space. The L♮-concavity implies the monotonicity of the optimal solution in some of
the model parameters, which enables us to characterize the interdependence between pricing
and repositioning decisions. We show that the optimal prices for the approximate model are
monotone in the inventory position which is defined as the number of containers at a port plus
those in transit to this port. The monotone properties not only can provide general guidance
for coordinating pricing with empty container management, but also can be used to reduce the
search space for the optimal policies. In addition, we derive the structure of the optimal policies
for the approximate model, which gives guidelines for the match-back policies adopted in practice
(c.f. Lam et al., 2007). In particular, we find that it is not always optimal to maintain the flow
conservation, i.e., to equate the container inflow and outflow at a port by repositioning empty
containers.
To quantity the performance of our approximation, we construct an upper bound of the exact
DP with the information relaxation-based duality technique (Brown et al., 2010). With this
computable upper bound, we demonstrate that our approximation can generate close-to-optimal
solutions and the average optimality gap is less than 2% in a variety of instances. In addition,
we numerically show that the value of coordinating pricing with empty container management
increases as demand imbalance escalates.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: (1) To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper that studies joint pricing and empty container repositioning decisions
in a stochastic and dynamic environment. (2) We develop a novel approximation approach
to overcome the curse of dimensionality arising from in-transit containers. (3) The structure
of the approximate optimal policies is analytically characterized. (4) From a methodological
perspective, we provide new applications of L♮-concavity and the information relaxation-based
duality in the domain of maritime transportation.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 describes the exact DP formulation. Section 4 presents the approximate model and analytical
results. Section 5 introduces the upper bound of the exact model and Section 6 reports numerical
results. Section 7 discusses several extensions and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Empty container repositioning has long been studied in the transportation literature separately
from pricing decisions. Crainic et al. (1993) propose time-space network models for the empty
container allocation problem in an inland transportation system consisting of seaports, inland
storage locations and customer sites. Cheung and Chen (1998) consider an ocean transportation
network with demand uncertainty and develop a two-stage stochastic programming. Erera et al.
(2009) adopt robust optimization techniques to address the problem in a two-stage planning
framework. In addition to uncertain demand and supply, Long et al. (2012) further take into
account the uncertainty in vessels’ weight and space capacity and solve the problem using a two-
stage stochastic programming. Although the above papers consider more complicated networks
(with more than two ports) than ours, their two-stage stochastic programming frameworks as-
sume that all uncertainties are resolved in the second stage. In reality, however, the management
of empty containers is a dynamic process where demand uncertainties are sequentially resolved.
Some authors have studied dynamic empty container management without pricing using
stochastic dynamic programming. Li et al. (2004) consider a single port and characterize the
optimal repositioning policy, based on which Li et al. (2007) further develop a heuristic for multi-
port systems. Lam et al. (2007) propose a dynamic programming formulation that minimizes the
long-run average cost. More closely related to our work is the seminal paper by Song (2007) in
which the author models two-port shipping systems based on a periodic-review inventory control
framework. In the case of container shortfall, additional containers are leased for emergency.
Ng et al. (2012) study a similar model but unsatisfied demand is backlogged. In these papers,
however, shipping demands are assumed exogenous and hence pricing decisions are not addressed.
Moreover, the models in Lam et al. (2007), Song (2007) and Ng et al. (2012) have implicitly
assumed that the transit time between two ports is much shorter than one decision period so
that their dynamic programming models have only a single state variable. In this paper, we
fully relax this assumption and allow for multi-period transit times. This, however, leads to a
high-dimensional stochastic DP which is generally intractable. A novel approximation approach
is then proposed to reduce the state dimension and provide close-to-optimal solutions.
It is worth noting that several studies have attemped to address pricing decisions with stylized
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deterministic models. Zhou and Lee (2009) study a Bertrand competition between two ocean
liners operating two-port services. Empty containers must be repositioned in order to offset the
imbalance of demands in the two directions. Recently, Chen et al. (2016) extend the framework
of Zhou and Lee (2009) to incorporate waste shipments via empty repositioning. However, both
models are static and neither one takes into account demand uncertainty.
Our work is also related to the literature on vehicle repositioning in fleet management. Gor-
man (2001) and King and Topaloglu (2007) assume that the number of loads on a traffic lane is
a deterministic function of price and the decision maker jointly determines the price charged for
each traffic lane and the number of vehicles to be relocated within the network. Topaloglu and
Powell (2007) further capture demand uncertainty and model the joint optimization problem
as a stochastic dynamic pricing problem. Our problem is different from the models in the fleet
management literature in that our objective function includes container-based operating costs
(i.e., storage and leasing costs) which are nonlinear and mirror the overage and underage costs
in inventory management.
Our paper can also be positioned in the literature on inventory management with pricing.
Thowsen (1975), Federgruen and Heching (1999) and Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004) are the
representative works along this line. We refer interested readers to the comprehensive survey
articles such as Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003), Chen and Simchi-Levi (2012) and Chen
and Chen (2015). Because of several salient features of empty containers manage, our model
departs from ordinary inventory models in several ways. First, after satisfying demand, the
stock of traditional commodities is consumed, whereas empty containers are still available (at
the other location). Second, in the liner service, the pricing decision for one voyage affects not
only the inventory level at the origin port but also that at the destination port. Third, instead
of periodically replenishing inventory through an outside source, in our problem the ocean liner
determines how to redistribute empty containers within the system.
3 The Model
We consider an ocean liner providing transportation services between two ports in a finite plan-
ning horizon divided into T periods. The transit time between the two ports is L periods where
L ≥ 1 is a positive integer. The liner maintains a one-period service frequency. Since the voyages
in both directions are operated in each period, the liner must deploy 2L vessels on the cyclic
service route to maintain the service frequency. For example, when one period is equal to one
week, the shipping service is operated on a weekly basis. If the transit time is one week, i.e.,
L = 1, two vessels must be deployed on the service route such that there is a vessel departing
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from each port once a week.
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) Prior to the voyages in a period, the liner announces
the prices for both directions; (2) demands are realized and the voyages that commenced L
periods ago arrive at the destination ports; (3) based on realized demands, the liner decides how
many empty containers to be repositioned and then launches new voyages in both directions.
For the t-th voyage (t = 1, 2, ..., T + 1), let dit = random demand from port i to port j and
pit = price charged for the voyage from port i to port j. Throughout the paper, we use indexes
i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j to indicate the two different ports.
Like Federgruen and Heching (1999) and Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004), we assume pit is
selected from a finite interval [pi
t
, p¯it] where p
i
t
(resp. p¯it) is the lowest (resp. highest) feasible
price to be charged.
The expected shipping demand from port i to port j in every period t is a function of pit,
denoted by Dit(p
i
t). The actual demand d
i
t is assumed to be D
i
t(p
i
t) plus an additive random noise
ǫit:
dit = D
i
t(p
i
t) + ǫ
i
t, (1)
where the ǫit’s are continuous random variables with known distributions and are independent
across periods. Without loss of generality, we assume E[ǫit] = 0 for all i and t. In addition, we
have assumed that the integrality constraints on demands and shipments are negligible. This is
a reasonable assumption when the shipping line manages a large number of containers to meet
substantial demand volumes.
Assumption 1. For all p ∈ [pi
t
, p¯it], t and i, d
i
t = D
i
t(p
i
t)+ ǫ
i
t is nonnegative, and D
i
t(p
i
t) is finite
and strictly decreasing in pit.
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Let λit be the expected demand from port i to port j in period t and A
i
t(λ
i
t) denote the inverse
demand function, i.e., the inverse function of Dit(p
i
t). The expected gross revenue can therefore
be written as rit(λ
i
t) = λ
i
tA
i
t(λ
i
t). Equivalent to determining p
i
t within [p
i
t
, p¯it], we can choose
λit from a given interval [λ
i
t, λ¯
i
t]. We make the following assumption: The expected revenue is
concave in the expected demand.2
Assumption 2. For all t and i, rit(λ) is concave and differentiable in λ for λ ∈ [λ
i
t, λ¯
i
t].
Note that the demands are realized after the prices are determined but before the number
of empty containers to be repositioned is decided. For the analysis, it is convenient to have
1In the ocean shipping industry, the overall demand generally exhibits a low elasticity. However, individual
carriers can still influence their demand by adjusting the freight rate, especially when there are substitutable
services on the same route.
2Assumption 2 is satisfied by many commonly used demand functions, e.g., linear demand D(p) = a−kp, logit
demand D(p) = e
a−kp
1+ea−kp
, exponential demand D(p) = ae−kp and log demand D(p) = log(a− kp), where a, k > 0.
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Figure 2: The sequence of events
the random noises realized at the end of each period. To achieve this, we consider events in
(decision) period t as follows: (1) At the beginning of period t, the liner decides the number
of empty containers to be repositioned based on the realized demands for the t-th voyage; (2)
the liner announces pit+1; (3) demands d
i
t+1’s are realized. Figure 2 illustrates this sequence of
events, where the starting and completion times of each voyage are indicated by dashed lines,
since they are not essential to our analysis. For example, the (t−L+1)-th voyage may also end
prior to the announcement of pit+1’s, but all of our results would remain the same.
Laden containers are unloaded immediately upon arrival. Thus, at the beginning of period
t, both laden and empty containers on the most recently completed voyage are available for the
next voyage. Vessel space is assumed to be sufficient, as ocean liners are usually more concerned
about the number of empty containers as the main capacity constraint.
Before a voyage begins, if the realized demand exceeds the volume that can be shipped
with the liner’s own empty container available at a port, additional containers will be leased3
immediately from outside vendors to meet the demand. We assume that the liner can always
lease enough containers to satisfy demands on time.4 The leasing cost is proportional to the
duration of lease. In addition, we also adopt the common assumption in the literature: All
containers are functionally identical, so the liner may return any idle containers to the vendor
(see, for example, Cheung and Chen, 1998; Song, 2007). This assumption implies that in a
location where out-of-system containers are leased, once some containers become idle in that
location, they will be automatically returned to the vendor to shorten the lease duration.5 If
3To avoid confusion, throughout the paper, we refer to these short-term leased containers simply as leased
containers. Ocean liners may also have long-term leased containers, but here we simply treat them as the liner’s
own.
4As mentioned by Cheung and Chen (1998), in reality, ocean liners are seldom unable to find enough containers
from external sources. Therefore, they rarely reject or backlog customer orders.
5In practice, it is prohibitively costly to track every single container due to the huge number of containers
being handled. Tracking and returning exactly every single container that was leased is therefore impossible.
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there are idle containers after the voyage has begun, an inventory holding cost will be incurred
for each idle container per period. The holding cost refers to the expenses incurred for storing
idle containers in the port terminal/inland container yard.6
Accordingly, define the following cost parameters for each period t:
bit = leasing cost per period for one unit of container at port i;
hit = inventory holding cost per period for one unit of container at port i;
cft = one-time cost for handling one unit of laden container on the t-th voyage;
cet = one-time cost for handling one unit of empty container on the t-th voyage.
Assumption 3. cet > h
i
t for all t and i.
The above assumption requires that it be cheaper to hold containers in inland depots than to
load them on board. If this assumption fails, the liner would purposely load empty containers
on board to reduce inventory holding costs incurred in inland depots. This is clearly not common
in reality, as the cost for handling empty containers on a voyage is normally higher than that for
storing them inland. Throughout the paper, we will assume that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied
unless otherwise specified. Let
uit = number of empty containers to be repositioned from port i to port j on the t-th voyage;
zi0,t = number of available empty containers owned by the liner at the beginning of period
t at port i (note that when location i has a deficit capacity, zit will take a negative value, the
absolute value of which represents the number of containers being leased from location i);
zil,t = number of (both laden and empty) containers in transit that will arrive at port i in
period t+ l, where l = 1, 2, ..., L.
By definition, it follows that
ziL,t = d
j
t + u
j
t for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j (2)
which represents the total number of containers dispatched from port j in period t, including
laden containers (i.e., shipment demand djt ) and empty ones (i.e., u
j
t ).
The system dynamics are characterized by 2L+ 2 state variables, i.e., inventory levels zl,t =
(z1l,t, z
2
l,t) where l = 0, 1, ..., L− 1 and realized demands dt = (d
1
t , d
2
t ), together with the following
Even though containers come in different types, e.g., different sizes, given a sufficiently large volume (which we
have implicitly assumed by using continuous variables to count containers), it is reasonable to assume that the
liner can return containers of a particular size once there are idle containers on hand.
6The liner may also face a problem of whether to keep the idle containers in the port terminal or move them
to the inland container yard. This depends on the terminal operator’s pricing scheme for container storage, the
inland transportation cost, etc. See Lee and Yu (2012) for a study pertaining to this issue. In this paper, however,
we do not consider inland container flows and refer to the cost incurred for storing idle containers inland as the
inventory holding cost.
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equations:
zi0,t+1 = z
i
0,t − z
j
L,t + z
i
1,t , i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j (3)
zil,t+1 = z
i
l+1,t, for i = 1, 2, and l = 1, 2, ..., L − 1 (4)
dit+1 = λ
i
t+1 + ǫ
i
t+1 for i = 1, 2. (5)
In addition, we assume that the total number of containers owned by the liner, denoted by
N , is fixed during the planning horizon. Hence,
∑2
i=1
∑L−1
l=0 z
i
l,t = N for all t. Consequently, it is
sufficient to use 2L+ 1 state variables to describe the system dynamics. For ease of exposition,
we will continue presenting our model with 2L+2 state variables but use 2L+1 state variables
in the numerical study.
Inventory levels in 
period t
Before the t-th voyage:
During the t-th voyage:
After the t-th voyage:
Figure 3: Dynamics of inventory levels
Figure 3 illustrates how the inventory levels in the two locations evolve over time. We allow
inventory levels to be negative to capture the deficit scenario. That is, zi0,t−u
i
t−d
i
t < 0 indicates
that there are containers being leased at port i. For example, consider N = 30, L = 1 and at
the beginning of period t, z10,t = 10 at port 1 and hence the number of containers at port 2 is
given by z20,t = N − z
1
0,t = 20 since there are no containers in transit when L = 1. During the
t-th voyages, suppose that we ship 15 units of containers in each direction, i.e., z1L,t = z
2
L,t = 15.
During this voyage, in addition to the 30 units of containers at sea, the inventory level at port
1 equals z10,t − z
2
L,t = −5, indicating 5 units of containers being leased, and the inventory level
at port 2 is 5. At the end of period t, we will have z10,t+1 = −5 + 15 = 10 at port 1 and
z20,t+1 = N − z
1
0,t+1 = 20 at port 2, as the leased containers at port 1 have been returned once
extra containers become idle.
Let Git(x) = h
i
t · (x)
+ + bit · (x)
−, where (x)+ = max{x, 0} and (x)− = max{−x, 0}. The
leasing and inventory holding costs in period t at port i is then given by Git(z
i
0,t − z
j
L,t), since
zi0,t − z
j
L,t represents the inventory level at port i during the t-th period.
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For the timing of cash flow, for simplicity, we assume that the revenue and container handling
costs of a voyage are respectively received and paid at the end of the voyage. The container leasing
and holding costs in period t are incurred once the t-th voyage begins. Let 0 < α ≤ 1 be the
discount factor. The liner’s objective is to maximize the expected total profit over the entire
planning horizon.
We let the expected demands λt+1 = (λ
1
t+1, λ
2
t+1) and the number of containers loaded on
the t-th voyages zL,t = (z
1
L,t, z
2
L,t) be the decision variables in period t, where λ
i
t+1 ∈ [λ
i
t+1, λ¯
i
t+1]
and zjL,t ≥ d
i
t since u
i
t ≥ 0. Define Rt+1(λt+1) =
∑2
i=1[r
i
t+1(λ
i
t+1)− c
f
t+1λ
i
t+1] as the net revenue
from meeting demands on the (t+ 1)-th voyage. We use Jt(z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt) to denote the
profit-to-go function for period t. For t = 1, 2, ..., T , the DP recursion can then be written as
Jt(z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt) = max
λt+1,zL,t
ft(zL,t,λt+1, z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt) + c
e
t · (d
1
t + d
2
t )
s.t. λit+1 ∈ [λ
i
t+1, λ¯
i
t+1], z
j
L,t ≥ d
i
t, for i = 1, 2,
(6)
where
ft(zL,t,λt+1, z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt) =αRt+1(λt+1)−
2∑
i=1
(
cetz
i
L,t +G
i
t(z
i
0,t − z
j
L,t)
)
+ αEJt+1(z0,t+1, ..., zL−1,t+1,dt+1).
(7)
The state variables in period t + 1, i.e., (z0,t+1, z1,t+1, ..., zL−1,t+1,dt+1), are determined by
decision variables λt+1, zL,t, random noises ǫt and the state variables in period t according to
equations (3), (4) and (5).
In the expression, the net revenue from the (t + 1)-th voyage is counted in period t, which
is given by αRt+1(λt+1). The repositioning cost on the t-th voyage is given by c
e
t
∑2
i=1 u
i
t =
cet
(∑2
i=1 z
i
L,t −
∑2
i=1 d
i
t
)
where the term cet
∑2
i=1 d
i
t is removed from the reward function ft to
be optimized. As a termination condition, we set JT+1(z0,T+1, z1,T+1, ..., zL−1,T+1,dT+1) =
−
∑2
i=1G
i
T+1(z
i
0,T+1 − d
i
T+1) so that the container holding and leasing costs for the (T + 1)-th
voyages are included but no more voyages start after the (T + 1)-th voyages.
We close the subsection by remarking that Song (2007) has also studied a DP model for two-
depot shipping systems like ours. Our model is more general than his in two important aspects.
First, in Song’s model demand is exogenous and the liner only determines repositioning quantity,
whereas we endogenize the demand by incorporating pricing decisions. Second, unlike our model
where the inventory cost and leasing cost are charged according to the inventory levels during the
voyage, Song counts the costs based on the end-of-voyage inventory positions in each period. In
his model, a single state variable is enough to describe the dynamics, but this formulation is only
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suitable for the case where the transit time is very short relative to one period (i.e., L << 1).
Relaxing this assumption requires a larger state space with 2L+1 state variables. To cope with
the curse of dimensionality, in the next section we will propose an approximate formulation in
which the dimension of the state space can be reduced to three, regardless of the value of L.
4 The Approximate Model
4.1 State Dimension Reduction
Our approximation method aims to reduce the dimension of the state space, which is a major
difficulty in solving the exact DP (6). Following the often used transformation in the inventory
management literature (e.g., Porteus, 2002), we can use the inventory position (i.e., on-hand
inventory level plus orders in transit) to replace the inventory level at each port. In our system,
the inventory position at port i can be defined as xit =
∑L−1
l=0 z
i
l,t, i.e., the number of containers
at port i plus the containers in transit to port i. However, this does not resolve the curse of
dimensionality, as we must still keep track of the in-transit containers on each vessel zil,t during the
recursion to calculate the container leasing and holding costs Git(x
i
t−
∑L−1
l=1 z
i
l,t−z
j
L,t). Moreover,
the number of in-transit containers on each vessel can be dynamically controlled through pricing
and repositioning decisions.
Note that zil,t = d
j
t+l−L + u
j
t+l−L, i.e., the number of containers sent from port j to port
i in period t + l − L, which depends on the decision variables λt+l−L and u
i
t+l−L. We can
therefore approximate each zil,t with some fixed number z¯
i
l,t = d¯
i
t+l−L + u¯
i
t+l−L, where the values
of d¯it+l−L and u¯
i
t+l−L can be obtained beforehand by solving some outer optimization problems
with deterministic demand. In particular, we consider the following deterministic problem:
max
λit∈[λ
i
t,λ¯
i
t]
Rt(λt)− c
e
t · |λ
1
t − λ
2
t |, (8)
where the first term captures the net revenue of the t-th voyage and in the second term we
require that the demand imbalance be exactly offset through empty container repositioning at
a unit cost of cet . Problem (8) can be viewed as a static version of our original problem, which
is in the same spirit as that studied in Zhou and Lee (2009). Let λ¯1t and λ¯
2
t denote the optimal
solution to problem (8). We can then set d¯it+l−L = λ¯
i
t+l−L and u¯
i
t+l−L = (λ¯
j
t+1−L − λ¯
i
t+1−L)
+
and use z¯il,t = d¯
i
t+l−L + u¯
i
t+l−L to approximate z
i
l,t. In other words, we use the optimal container
flow derived from the static problem (8) to approximate the number of in-transit containers.7
7Our approximation approach is inspired by Federgruen and Heching (1999, 2002) where the authors propose
the idea of using a fixed price path derived from a deterministic version of the problem to approximate in-transit
inventories.
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We define an approximate cost function
Gˆit(x
i
t − z
j
L,t) = G
i
t(x
i
t −
L−1∑
l=1
z¯il,t − z
j
L,t)
and use it to approximate the value function in the exact DP (6). Since x1t + x
2
t = N for all
t, we will hereafter simply use xt to denote the inventory position at port 1 and the inventory
position at port 2 is then given by N − xt. For t = 1, 2, ..., T , using the relation z
i
L,t = d
j
t + u
j
t ,
our approximate DP recursion can be written as
JAt (xt,dt) = max
λit+1∈[λ
i
t+1,λ¯
i
t+1],u
i
t≥0
fAt (ut,λt+1, xt,dt)
= max
λit+1∈[λ
i
t+1,λ¯
i
t+1],u
i
t≥0
{αRt+1(λt+1)− c
e
t · (u
1
t + u
2
t )
− Gˆ1t (xt − u
1
t − d
1
t )− Gˆ
2
t (N − xt − u
2
t − d
2
t ) + αEJ
A
t+1(xt+1,dt+1)},
(9)
where
xt+1 = xt − u
1
t − d
1
t + u
2
t + d
2
t , (10)
and dt+1 is determined by (5). The termination condition is then rewritten as J
A
T+1(xT+1,dT+1) =
−Gˆ1T+1(xT+1 − d
1
T+1)− Gˆ
2
T+1(N − xT+1 − d
2
T+1).
Note that the approximate formulation involves three state variables xt, d
1
t and d
2
t . The
inventory level xt alone is not sufficient because repositioning quantities are determined after
the actual demands are received. That is, the repositioning decision is contingent on d1t and d
2
t
as well. Intuitively, the ocean liner would reposition fewer (resp. more) containers if the realized
demand in the same direction turns out to be higher (resp. lower).
We can use the optimal control policy for problem (9) as an approximate solution to the
exact DP (6). The merit of our approximate model is that no matter how long the transit time
is, the proposed approximation has only three state variables whereas the exact model needs
2L+ 1 state variables with L-period transit times, with the understanding that one more state
variable increases the state space in an exponential manner! Moreover, if the transit time is one
period, i.e., L = 1, the approximate model is equivalent to the exact formulation (6), since we
only approximate in-transit containers which appear in the value function only when L > 1.
4.2 Analysis of the Approximate Model
Although we have reduced the state space to three dimensions in the approximate model (9), it
remains challenging to analyze the structure of the optimal policy to this model.
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4.2.1 Preliminaries
To derive the monotonicity of optimal policies, we apply the concept of L♮-concavity (e.g., Pang
et al., 2012). Interested readers are referred to Appendix A for formal statements of its definition
and properties. L♮-concavity implies ordinary concavity and supermodularity, thus allowing us
to characterize how the optimal decision is monotonic in multi-dimensional parameters. For
example, if we maximize function g(v, ζ) over ζ ≥ 0 where v is a vector consisting of multiple
parameters, roughly speaking, the L♮-concavity of g(v, ζ) implies that the optimal solution ζ(v)
is nondecreasing in v. In order to obtain the L♮-concavity of the value function, we transform
the original state variables as follows. Define
vt =


0 −1 0
1 −1 0
1 −1 1




xt
d1t
d2t

 =


−d1t
xt − d
1
t
xt − d
1
t + d
2
t


as the new state vector. Note that the state space V = {v : v1 ≤ 0, v2 ≤ v3} forms a lattice, as
the inequality involving more than one variable has exactly two variables with opposite signs (see
Example 2.2.7 in Topkis (1998)). Although this transformation is performed mainly for technical
reasons, the state vector v does have some physical meanings: v2t represents the inventory position
at port 1 deducting the number of containers that have been reserved for the t-th voyage, and
v3t indicates the net inventory position at port 1 after the inbound and outbound containers
reserved for the t-th voyage are taken into account.
Then, define
y1t = v
3
t − u
1
t + u
2
t ,
y2t = y
1
t + u
1
t ,
y3t = y
1
t + λ
2
t+1.
Note that y1t is a critical variable in our problem, and y
1
t = xt+1, i.e., it equals the inventory
position at port 1 at the end of the t-th voyage/at the beginning of the (t+1)-th voyage. We will
refer to y1t as the end-of-voyage inventory position (at port 1). Note that the inventory position
at port 2 is simply given by N − y1t .
Accordingly, the approximate DP formulation (9) can be rewritten as
JAt (vt) = max
(u1t ,y
1
t ,y
2
t ,y
3
t ,λ
1
t+1)∈A
{αRt+1(λ
1
t+1, y
3
t − y
1
t )− c
e
t · (u
1
t + y
2
t )− Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t )
−Gˆ2t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t ) + αEJ
A
t+1(vt+1)}+ c
e
tv
3
t , for t = 1, 2, ..., T
(11)
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and, for the last period,
JAT+1(vT+1) = −Gˆ
1
T+1(v
2
T+1)− Gˆ
2
T+1(N + v
1
T+1 − v
3
T+1), (12)
where the system dynamics translates to
vt+1 =


−λ1t+1 − ǫ
1
t+1
v3t − u
1
t + u
2
t − λ
1
t+1 − ǫ
1
t+1
v3t − u
1
t + u
2
t − λ
1
t+1 − ǫ
1
t+1 + λ
2
t+1 + ǫ
2
t+1


= (0, y1t , y
3
t + ǫ
2
t+1)
T − (λ1t+1 + ǫ
1
t+1)e.
The action space A = {(u1t , y
1
t , y
2
t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1) : u
1
t ≥ 0, y
2
t ≥ v
3
t , u
1
t + y
1
t = y
2
t , y
3
t − y
1
t ∈
[λ2t+1, λ¯
2
t+1], λ
1
t+1 ∈ [λ
1
t+1, λ¯
1
t+1]}. A is nonlattice due to the constraint u
1
t + y
1
t = y
2
t . The
nonlattice structure gives rise to another analytical difficulty, because a generic way to show the
preservation of L♮-concavity (like supermodularity) under maximization requires the constraint
set to be lattice. 8
In this paper, we circumvent the nonlattice structure by dividing the decisions into two stages:
The liner determines firstly the repositioning quantity corresponding to variables u1t , y
1
t and y
2
t ,
then the prices for the next voyage corresponding to variables λ1t+1 and y
3
t . In the second-stage
decision, for any given (u1t , y
1
t , y
2
t ), we find that the maximization over λ
1
t+1 and y
3
t depends on
other parameters only through y1t . In other words, the pricing decision is made based on the
inventory position for the upcoming voyage, given any repositioning quantities. Define
Ht(y
1
t ) = max
(y3t ,λ
1
t+1)∈A(y
1
t )
α{Rt+1(λ
1
t+1, y
3
t −y
1
t )+EJ
A
t+1[(0, y
1
t , y
3
t + ǫ
2
t+1)
T −(λ1t+1+ǫ
1
t+1)e]}, (13)
where A(y1t ) = {(y
3
t , λ
1
t+1) : y
3
t − y
1
t ∈ [λ
2
t+1, λ¯
2
t+1], λ
1
t+1 ∈ [λ
1
t+1, λ¯
1
t+1]}. The function Ht serves
as a key connection between pricing and repositioning decisions.
In the first stage, we solve
JAt (vt) = max{Ht(y
1
t )− c
e
t (u
1
t + y
2
t )− Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t )− Gˆ
2
t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t )}+ c
e
tv
3
t
s.t. y2t = y
1
t + u
1
t ,
y2t ≥ v
3
t , u
1
t ≥ 0.
(14)
8Recently, Chen et al. (2013) identify some sufficient conditions under which the L♮-concavity can be preserved
even when the constraint set is nonlattice. Their results require that the value function is parametrized by two-
dimensional state vectors. Unfortunately, our state vector has three dimensions.
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Eliminating y1t with the equality constraint y
2
t = y
1
t + u
1
t , the feasible region of (14) then
becomes lattice, leading to the first-stage repositioning decision.
JAt (vt) = max
y2t≥v
3
t ,u
1
t≥0
{Ht(y
2
t − u
1
t )− c
e
t · (u
1
t + y
2
t )− Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t )
− Gˆ2t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t )}+ c
e
tv
3
t
(15)
With the two-stage reformulation defined above, it can be shown that the value function of
our problem is indeed L♮-concave in the transformed state variables. We relegate all technical
proofs to the appendices.
Lemma 1. For t = 1, 2, ..., T + 1, Ht(y) is concave in y, and J
A
t (v) is L
♮-concave in v.
To establish the L♮-concavity, we have made use of the fact that the pricing decision is affected by
other variables only through y1t . It should be noted that, in general, with a nonlattice constraint
set and a three-dimensional state space, the L♮-concavity may not be preserved. Chen et al.
(2013) have provided a counterexample. Fortunately, we are able to prove the L♮-concavity of
JAt by exploiting the special structure of our problem. With the two-stage treatment above, the
L♮-concavity of JAt in fact follows as long as J
A
t+1 is jointly concave. From this perspective, the
L♮-concavity is due to the inherent nature of our problem, rather than preservation under the
DP recursion.9
4.2.2 Monotone Properties of the Optimal Policy
The following theorem characterizes the monotone properties of the optimal price vector with
respect to the inventory position, where we denote by λit+1(y) the optimal expected demand from
port i to port j given that the end-of-voyage inventory position at port 1 is equal to y.
Theorem 1. Given any repositioning quantities (u1t , u
2
t ), the optimal price vector (p
1∗
t+1, p
2∗
t+1)
depends only on y1t = v
3
t − u
1
t + u
2
t , i.e., the end-of-voyage inventory position. Furthermore, for
ω > 0
0 ≤ λ1t+1(y
1
t + ω)− λ
1
t+1(y
1
t ) ≤ ω,
−ω ≤ λ2t+1(y
1
t + ω)− λ
2
t+1(y
1
t ) ≤ 0.
That is, p1∗t+1 (resp. p
2∗
t+1) is nonincreasing (resp. nondecreasing) in y
1
t with bounded sensitivities.
Theorem 1 implies that the optimal pricing and repositioning quantities should be interdepen-
dent. With more empty containers available at port 1, a lower price should be charged for the
voyage from port 1 to port 2 to attract more demand in that direction. Likewise, a higher price
9We would like to thank Xin Chen for pointing out this issue, which helps us clarify the implications behind
the proof of L♮-concavity.
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should be charged for the reverse direction to reduce the number of laden containers coming
back to port 1. In addition, our results indicate that despite the complex evolution of (laden
and empty) container flows in the system, to determine pt+1, the manager only needs to base
the pricing decision on the inventory position at the end of the t-th voyage.
The following theorem states the monotone properties of the optimal repositioning quantity,
where we denote by u1∗t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) the optimal quantity repositioned from port 1 to port 2 given
any state (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ). Note that the optimal repositioning quantity from port 2 to port 1 has the
same properties regarding the corresponding state, as we can simply swap the ports’ indices in
the model.
Theorem 2. (i) For any ω > 0, the optimal repositioning quantity u1∗t satisfies
0 ≤ u1∗t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t + ω)− u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t )
≤ u1∗t (xt + ω, d
1
t , d
2
t )− u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t )
≤ u1∗t (xt, d
1
t − ω, d
2
t )− u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) ≤ ω.
(ii) Assuming that ω is such that u2∗t = 0 for all states considered in the above inequalities, the
third inequality in part (i) holds with equality, i.e., u1∗t (xt+ω, d
1
t , d
2
t ) = u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t −ω, d
2
t ). That
is, u1∗t is affected by xt and d
1
t only through xt − d
1
t .
Part (i) of Theorem 2 implies that more empty containers should be repositioned from port
1 to port 2, if we have more (resp. less) shipping demand for the voyage in the opposite (resp.
same) direction or more empty containers are available at port 1 at the beginning of voyage. More
interestingly, the repositioning quantity is more (resp. less) sensitive to the number of empty
containers available at the origin port than to the shipping demand in the opposite (resp. same)
direction. Furthermore, all of the sensitivities are bounded by one. Assuming differentiability,
Theorem 2 implies 0 ≤
∂u1∗t
∂d2t
≤
∂u1∗t
∂xt
≤ −
∂u1∗t
∂d1t
≤ 1.
Part (ii) of Theorem 2 states the sensitivities of u1∗t when the perturbation in state variables
does not change the optimal repositioning direction. With a fixed d2t , the repositioning quantity
from port 1 to port 2 will remain the same as long as the term xt − d
1
t is unchanged, assuming
that the repositioning direction is always from port 1 to port 2 in the optimal solution. That
is, the effect of a higher inventory position at port 1 can be offset by an increase in the demand
from port 1 to port 2.
Our result is in notable contrast to that of Song (2007). In Song (2007), the optimal reposi-
tioning quantity depends only on the end-of-voyage inventory level xt− d
1
t + d
2
t . In other words,
the number of empty containers to be repositioned remains unchanged if d1t increases and d
2
t
decreases by the same amount. In our setting, however, we show that u1∗t is more sensitive to d
1
t
16
than to d2t . The reason is that our model captures the time lag in transporting containers. Intu-
itively, when empty containers need to be shipped from port 1 to 2, d1t affects the repositioning
decision more immediately than d2t , as d
2
t will not arrive at port 1 until the end of the period.
From the computational perspective, we note that Theorems 1 and 2 can be iteratively
leveraged to dramatically reduce the search space for the optimal decisions. For example, to
solve the DP, we need to find the optimal control for every possible state (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ). Once
we find u1∗t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) under some state (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ), it suffices to search for the optimal reposi-
tioning quantity under another state (xt + ω, d
1
t , d
2
t ) where ω > 0 between u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) and
u1∗t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) + ω.
4.2.3 The Structure of the Approximate Optimal Policy
As the pricing decision is affected only by the end-of-voyage inventory position y1t , we are inter-
ested in representing the optimal policy in terms of y1∗t where y
1∗
t = xt − d
1
t + d
2
t − u
1∗
t + u
2∗
t .
In what follows, we will focus on repositioning decisions, and the optimal prices are determined
once the repositioning quantity is chosen. Let ut be the net repositioning quantity: ut = u
1
t −u
2
t .
We show in Appendix C that it is not optimal to simultaneously transport empty containers in
both directions. That is, at most one of u1t and u
2
t is positive. We can hence rewrite problem
(15) as an unconstrained optimization over ut:
max
ut
Ht(v
3
t − ut)−Wt(ut,vt), (16)
where Wt(ut,vt) = c
e
t · |ut|+ Gˆ
1
t (v2 − [ut]
+) + Gˆ2t (N + v
1
t − v
3
t − [ut]
−).
It is not difficult to verify that the cost term Wt(ut,v) is piecewise convex in ut. Together
with the concavity of Ht, the first-order condition guarantees the global optimality. To obtain
more explicit characterizations of the optimal policy, we need a mild assumption:
Assumption 4. Over all periods, it is not optimal to lease more empty containers than the
current shortfall and transport the extra ones to the other location.
Assumption 4 excludes the situation where the liner leases extra containers from one location
and repositions them to the other location. This rarely happens in practice because (1) the liner
normally has easy access to container leasing companies in most port regions of the world; and
(2) doing so will incur a significant cost for handling extra empty containers during the voyage.
Clearly, a sufficient condition for Assumption 4 to hold is that the cost parameters cet and b
i
t are
time-invariant and b1t = b
2
t (i.e., leasing containers in two locations are equally costly).
Under Assumption 4, the optimal net repositioning quantity u∗t must be within the interval
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−(N −xt− d
2
t )
+ ≤ u∗t ≤ (xt− d
1
t )
+. We can therefore restrict our attention to the repositioning
quantities that do not exceed the number of on-hand empty containers, excluding those being
reserved for the upcoming voyage. In some sense, we can view −(N−xt−d
2
t )
+ ≤ ut ≤ (xt−d
1
t )
+
as a state-dependent capacity constraint.
Clearly, u∗t = 0 if d
1
t ≥ xt and d
2
t ≥ N − xt; u
∗
t ≥ 0 if d
1
t < xt and d
2
t ≥ N − xt; u
∗
t ≤ 0 if
d1t ≥ xt and d
2
t < N − xt. In the above three cases, the repositioning direction is simply due to
the capacity constraint. For the remaining case where d1t < xt and d
2
t < N − xt, by examining
first-order optimality conditions of (16), we can conclude that there exist two thresholds v¯t and
vt such that (i) u
∗
t = 0 if vt ≤ v
3
t ≤ v¯t; (ii) u
∗
t ≥ 0 when v
3
t > v¯t; and (iii) u
∗
t ≤ 0 when v
3
t < vt.
Recall that v3t = xt − d
1
t + d
2
t . The repositioning direction depends on the magnitude of the
realized demand imbalance d1t −d
2
t . Detailed mathematical discussions can be found in the proof
of Theorem 3 in Appendix D.
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Figure 4: The state segmentation according to the repositioning direction
The overall state space, according to the sign of u∗t , is segmented into four regions below (see
also Figure 4).
Ω1 =

(xt, d1t , d2t ) : xt − v¯t ≤ d
1
t − d
2
t ≤ xt − vt,
d1t < xt, d
2
t < N − xt


Ω2 =

(xt, d1t , d2t ) : d
1
t − d
2
t < xt − v¯t,
d1t < xt, d
2
t < N − xt


⋃{
(xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) : d
1
t < xt, d
2
t ≥ N − xt
}
Ω3 =

(xt, d1t , d2t ) : d
1
t − d
2
t > xt − vt,
d1t < xt, d
2
t < N − xt


⋃{
(xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) : d
1
t ≥ xt, d
2
t < N − xt
}
Ω4 =
{
(xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) : d
1
t ≥ xt, d
2
t ≥ N − xt
}
As three state variables are involved, for ease of exposition, we illustrate the state segmen-
tation with a d1t -d
2
t coordinate system where xt takes a fixed value, as shown in Figure 4. In the
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following theorem, we characterize the optimal repositioning quantity in each of the segments Ωi.
The pricing decision is then determined by the end-of-voyage inventory positions xt−d
1
t+d
2
t −u
∗
t .
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 4, for any given state (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ), the optimal policy can be
characterized by two target inventory positions (s∗Ot, s
∗
It) and a price vector p
∗
t+1(y), where y is
the end-of-voyage inventory position. The optimal decision in period t is given by one of the
following cases:
(I) If (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) ∈ Ω1
⋃
Ω4, reposition nothing, i.e., u
∗
t = 0 and charge p
∗
t+1(xt − d
1
t + d
2
t ).
(II) If (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) ∈ Ω2, the net repositioning quantity is given by
u∗t =


0 if xt − d
1
t + d
2
t ≤ v¯t
xt − d
1
t + d
2
t − s
∗
Ot if xt − d
1
t + d
2
t > v¯t and d
2
t < s
∗
Ot
xt − d
1
t otherwise.
The optimal price vectors for the above three cases are p∗t+1(xt − d
1
t + d
2
t ), p
∗
t+1(s
∗
Ot) and
p∗t+1(d
2
t );
(III) If (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) ∈ Ω3, the net repositioning quantity is given by
u∗t =


0 if xt − d
1
t + d
2
t ≥ vt
xt − d
1
t + d
2
t − s
∗
It if xt − d
1
t + d
2
t < vt and d
1
t < N − s
∗
It
−(N − xt − d
2
t ) otherwise.
The optimal price vectors for the above three cases are p∗t+1(xt − d
1
t + d
2
t ), p
∗
t+1(s
∗
It) and
p∗t+1(N − d
1
t ).
The structural results provide general guidance for the match-back policy in practice (cf. Lam
et al., 2007). The idea of match-back policies is intuitive, namely, to maintain the flow conserva-
tion at each port, i.e., to equate the container inflow with the outflow. Interestingly, our results
suggest that it is not always optimal to maintain this flow conservation. Theorem 3, which is
illustrated in Figure 5 for fixed xt and different combinations of (d
1
t , d
2
t ), prescribes when to
pursue flow conservation and to what extent it should be maintained.
In particular, it is optimal to not reposition empty containers and thus forgo flow conservation
when the state variables fall into region (a) in Figure 5. This happens when the realized demand
imbalance is not significant or when both realized demands are so high that no container is
idle at either port. As a substitute instrument, the freight rates p∗t+1 should be adjusted in
accordance with the actual end-of-voyage inventory position xt− d
1
t + d
2
t . In regions (b) and (c),
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Figure 5: The structure of optimal policy (P1: port 1; P2: port 2)
it is optimal to reposition some containers from port 1 to port 2. Our results suggest that there
is a target inventory position s∗Ot while repositioning containers, where subscript “O” represents
“outbound” from the perspective of port 1. In region (b), the optimal outflow from port 1 equals
d1t +u
∗
t = xt+d
2
t −s
∗
Ot, given an inflow of d
2
t . If the current inventory position is the target level,
i.e., xt = s
∗
Ot, we just need to equate the outflow with the inflow, i.e., d
1
t+u
∗
t = d
2
t . Otherwise, we
should still maintain flow conservation but leave the end-of-voyage inventory position as s∗Ot. In
region (c), demand from port 2 exceeds s∗Ot. It is hence impossible to end up with an inventory
position s∗Ot. In this case, we should dispatch all of the empty containers at port 1, and the
end-of-voyage inventory position will be d2t . Depending on whether or not the target inventory
position is achieved, the optimal freight rates should be either pt+1(s
∗
Ot) or pt+1(d
2
t ). Regions (d)
and (e) mirror regions (b) and (c) except that port 1 is in deficit and the repositioning direction
is reversed. In this case, however, the target inventory position becomes s∗It where the subscript
“I” represents “inbound” from the perspective of port 1.
In addition, it is interesting to contrast our results with the well-developed theories in inven-
tory management. As opposed to the celebrated base-stock policy for single-location inventory
systems, the allocation of empty containers in our system may oscillate between two different
inventory positions, depending on the repositioning direction.
Proposition 1. The target inventory position (at port 1) for outbound repositioning is higher
than that for inbound repositioning, i.e., s∗Ot ≥ s
∗
It for all t.
Proposition 1 highlights another interesting property: The target inventory position is dependent
on the repositioning direction. When empty containers are transported from port 1 to port 2,
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the target inventory position for port 1 equals s∗Ot; this target level becomes s
∗
It when empty
containers are shipped from port 2 to port 1. Furthermore, s∗Ot ≥ s
∗
It. This implies that when
trade is unbalanced, it is optimal to aim for a higher inventory position when the port has a
capacity surplus than when it has a capacity deficit. Proposition 1 implies that it is not eco-
nomical to maintain the same inventory position for both the deficit and surplus scenarios. This
result can be explained by comparing the cost margins for outbound and inbound repositioning.
For outbound repositioning, the cost margin for holding one more unit of inventory at port 1 is
given by −cet + h
1
t , as it increases the inventory holding cost by h
1
t but reduces the repositioning
quantity by one unit. The cost margin is actually negative by Assumption 3, which implies
that holding more inventory at port 1 lowers the cost incurred in period t. On the other hand,
for inbound repositioning, increasing one more unit of inventory position at port 1 leads to a
one-unit increase in the repositioning quantity, and a one-unit decrease in the number of idle
containers at port 2. Thus, the cost margin for inbound repositioning is given by cet−h
2
t , which is
greater than that for outbound repositioning. In addition, no matter whether the repositioning
direction is outbound or inbound, the effect of holding one more unit of inventory position at
port 1 on future periods (reflected by the function Ht) is the same. Therefore, it is optimal to
keep a lower inventory position at port 1 when empty containers are repositioned from port 2 to
port 1, as compared to the case when empty containers are repositioned from port 1 to port 2.
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Figure 6: A numerical example of the approximate optimal policy
Figure 6 provides a numerical example10 to illustrate the end-of-voyage inventory positions in
the optimal policy, which validates our analytical result. There are two flat areas in which the
inventory positions are constant. Consistent with Proposition 1, the target inventory positions
for outbound and inbound repositioning are different from each other.
10We consider a two-period problem with N = 150, α = 1, x1 = 80, p
1
2(λ
1
2) = 600 − 4λ
1
2, p
2
2(λ
2
2) = 800 − 4λ
1
2,
where 30 ≤ λ12, λ
2
2 ≤ 100. Other parameters are time-invariant and identical for both ports: c
e = 50, cf = 100,
h = 30, b = 80, ǫ ∼ unif [−10, 10].
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Proposition 2. For all t, (i) s∗Ot is increasing in c
e
t and decreasing in h
1
t ; (ii) s
∗
It is decreasing
in cet and increasing in h
2
t ; (iii) consequently, s
∗
Ot − s
∗
It is increasing in c
e
t and decreasing in h
1
t
and h2t .
Proposition 2 states how s∗Ot and s
∗
It change with repositioning and storage costs. When reposi-
tioning is more expensive, the gap between s∗Ot and s
∗
It will be larger as it is less economical to
have the same inventory position in both surplus and deficit scenarios. The effect of the holding
cost on s∗Ot− s
∗
It is the opposite, because the gap between the repositioning cost and the holding
cost narrows as hit increases.
We close this section by recapping our key analytical findings and their managerial implica-
tions. As established in Theorems 1 and 3, in addition to repositioning empty containers, pricing
serves as another instrument to cope with demand imbalance. For a port with more excess
containers, the price of its outward voyage would be lower to attract more demand. This result
is consistent with the empirical finding that for European countries that normally have more
imports than exports, inward freight rates are on average 23% higher than for outward ones (cf.
De Oliveira, 2014). Additionally, the structure of the optimal repositioning policy characterized
in Theorem 3 echoes the match-back policy used in practice (see, e.g., Lam et al., 2007) and
we provide conditions under which a simple match back strategy is optimal to our approximate
model.
5 Upper Bounds
To evaluate the performance of the control policy generated by the approximate DP, we need to
find a relatively tight but computable upper bound of the exact value function J1(z0,1, z1,1, ..., zL−1,1,d1),
because solving the exact DP formulation in (6) is extremely time consuming even when L is
small due to the high-dimensional state space.
In this section, we adopt the information relaxation-based duality approach developed in
Brown et al. (2010) to obtain an upper bound of the exact value function. We consider the
perfect information relaxation in which the decision maker in period t is allowed to utilize com-
plete future information, i.e., realizations of random terms ǫt+1,ǫt+2,..., ǫT+1, thus violating the
nonanticipativity constraints. Let Υ = (ǫˆ1, ǫˆ2, ..., ǫˆT , ǫˆT+1) denote a randomly generated sample
path of demand noise. Following Brown et al. (2010), we write the dual of the original DP (6)
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as follows:
J¯t(z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt; Υ) = max
λit+1 ∈ [λ
i
t+1, λ¯
i
t+1],
zjL,t ≥ d
i
t for i = 1, 2
{
αRt+1(λt+1)−
2∑
i=1
(
cetz
i
L,t +G
i
t(z
i
0,t − z
j
L,t)
)
−πt(zL,t,λt+1, z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt)
+αJ¯t+1(z0,t+1, ..., zL−1,t+1,λt+1 + ǫˆt+1,k; Υ)
}
+ cet (d
1
t + d
2
t ),
(17)
where
πt(zL,t,λt+1, z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt) = J
A
t+1(
L−1∑
l=0
z1l,t+1,λt+1+ǫˆt+1,k)−Eǫt+1
[
JAt+1(
L−1∑
l=0
z1l,t+1,λt+1 + ǫt+1)
]
.
(18)
In the above DP recursion, the zl,t+1’s are transformed from the zl,t’s according to (3) and (4)
as before, but we allow an imaginary decision maker to use the future information on the sample
path Υ. The function πt, defined as the difference between the approximate value function on the
sample path and its expected value over ǫt+1, serves as the penalty function: A strictly positive
penalty is imposed whenever the future information brings the imaginary decision maker a higher
profit-to-go.11 We note that πt is constructed according to Proposition 2.2 in Brown et al. (2010).
Therefore, the weak duality holds for problem (17) and the expectation of J¯t over Υ provides a
valid upper bound for the exact value function (6).
Theorem 4. For all t = 1, 2, ..., T and any state (z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt),
Jt(z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt) ≤ EΥ
[
J¯t(z0,t, z1,t, ..., zL−1,t,dt; Υ)
]
. (19)
In the numerical study, we will use simulation to evaluate the expectation in (19), i.e., solve the
dual problem (17) on a set of randomly generated sample paths and take the average as the
upper bound.
11If we define πt = 0, J¯t is the value function of our original problem when one can benefit more from future
information. Appendix B.1 reports a numerical study that compares the zero-penalty bound with the penalized
one according to (18). We note that, strictly speaking, our bound with zero penalty is different from a perfect-
information upper bound because the per-period reward is calculated based on the expected revenue function
Rt(λ) due to the assumption of additive random noise, rather than the realized revenue on a particular sample
path. In some sense, in estimating our upper bounds, we only partially leveraged the future information for
minimizing operational costs.
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6 Numerical Study
6.1 The Optimality Gap of the Approximation
We quantify the performance of our approximation approach using the upper bound constructed
in Section 5. The dynamic programming algorithms for both the approximate model (9) and the
dual problem (17) were coded in C++ and compiled with the GNU g++ compiler 6.3.0. The
computational experiment in this subsection was conducted on a cluster of Linux workstations
where each workstation was equipped with 64GB RAM and a 2.60GHz processor.
First, we test a set of instances with a two-period transit time (L = 2). In the numerical
experiments with L = 2, we discretized the state space into integer values. More precisely, we
assume that the inventory level at port 1 within a sufficiently large range is between −⌈N/2⌉ and
N + ⌈N/2⌉ and the number of in-transit containers on each vessel is between the lowest possible
demand and ⌊N/2⌋.12 The discretized state space contains all the integer values within these
ranges, together with all the possible integer values of demand dt. We consider a stationary
setting with α = 1, cf = 0.5, h = 0.01 and the ǫ
i
t’s being independent and identically distributed
(iid) according to a uniform distribution U [−2, 2]. For notational ease, we suppress the index
t whenever appropriate. We vary other parameters as follows: T ∈ {5, 6}, N ∈ {25, 30, 35},
b ∈ {0.4, 0.6, 0.8}, and ce ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6}. The inverse demand function takes the form Ai(λ) =
ai − λ, where we consider two demand settings with (a1, a2) ∈ {(14, 12), (16, 10)} to simulate
different degrees of demand imbalance. The adjustment range [λi, λ¯i] is set as [λ
S
i − 2, λ
S
i + 2]
where λSi =
ai−cf
2 , denoting the maximizer of the net revenue R(λ) =
∑2
i=1(ai − λi − cf )λi.
The initial state is set as follows. The number of in-transit containers on each vessel is equal to
the optimal container flow in the static problem (8) but the allocation of the idle containers is
varied in two different ways: They are (i) equally split between two ports, or (ii) unequally split
with one quarter at Port 1 and three quarters at Port 2. We label these two setups as “equal”
and “unequal” cases, respectively.
In total, we solved 216 instances with all combinations of the above parameters using our
approximation approach. For each instance, we computed the expected profit under the ap-
proximate control policy, denoted by JApprox1 , and also evaluated the upper bound, denoted by
JUB1 , by solving the dual problem (17) on six randomly generated sample paths. The optimality
gap is calculated as
JUB1 −J
Approx
1
JUB
1
. Table 1 reports a summary of optimality gaps for different
combinations of T , N and initial states, where each combination includes 18 instances. Overall,
the average gap is less than 2%. It is worth noting that with the help of monotone properties
12Recall that the inventory level at port 2 need not be included as a state variable as the total number of
containers is fixed. Additionally, we note that ⌈x⌉ (⌊x⌋) denote rounding up (down) x to the nearest integer.
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Table 1: Performance of the approximate control policy when L = 2
T N
Initial Optimality Gap ( %)
State Average Median Max
5 25 Equal 1.88 1.68 3.12
Unequal 1.96 1.84 3.42
5 30 Equal 0.85 0.91 1.41
Unequal 1.47 1.47 2.36
5 35 Equal 1.12 0.71 3.27
Unequal 0.98 0.96 1.56
6 25 Equal 2.24 2.14 3.80
Unequal 2.59 2.49 5.09
6 30 Equal 1.04 1.03 1.91
Unequal 2.30 2.28 4.08
6 35 Equal 1.73 1.20 4.79
Unequal 1.13 0.99 2.28
derived in Section 4.2.2, our approximate DP can be solved within a few seconds. On the other
hand, in the case of T = 6, depending on the value of N , it can take more than ten hours obtain
the upper bound for a single instance. This suggests that even with L = 2, it is impossible to
solve the exact model within reasonable time, since demand uncertainty would further increase
the size of the exact model exponentially over periods.
Table 2: Performance of the approximate control policy when L = 3
T N
Initial Conservative Opt. Gap ( %)
State Average Median Max
5 30 Equal 4.19 4.08 10.17
Unequal 4.68 2.89 11.46
5 35 Equal 6.52 5.23 8.34
Unequal 5.32 5.24 10.78
5 40 Equal 4.18 7.47 12.23
Unequal 3.60 8.19 14.03
6 30 Equal 3.94 5.04 12.04
Unequal 4.67 5.12 16.78
6 35 Equal 7.26 3.85 13.24
Unequal 6.14 3.41 16.29
6 40 Equal 4.12 2.18 14.53
Unequal 3.15 1.53 15.22
In the second group of experiments, we tested the instances with a three-period transit
time (L = 3). To emulate a longer transit time, we consider N ∈ {30, 35, 40} and (a1, a2) =
{(10, 8), (12, 6)} to have more containers available relative to the per-period demand. Unfortu-
nately, the upper bound becomes much harder to compute due to the exponentially growing state
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space. To estimate the optimality gap within a reasonable time, we further discretized the ranges
of the inventory level and the numbers of in-transit containers into 20 and 5 equidistant points,
respectively.13 The demand dimension still contains all possible integer values. Tables 5 and 6 in
Appendix B report a numerical study suggesting that such discretization has little impact on the
solution quality but would overestimate the optimality gap. As such, our numerical experiments
for L = 3, conducted under the further discretized state space, provides a rather conservative
estimation of the optimality gap. As shown in Table 2, despite being overestimated, the average
and the median of gaps are still reasonably small, and the overall average gap is around 4.8%.14
Finally, we emphasize that we further discretized the state space merely because we need
to compute upper bounds and consistently estimate optimality gaps. It is not necessary to do
so when one is interested only in the approximate optimal policy, as the state dimension of our
approximate model is independent of L and our approximate model can in fact be applied for
even larger L.15 Unfortunately, we are not able to estimate the optimality gaps for L ≥ 4 since
the upper bound is not computable in that case. To test the performance of our approximate
approach with L ≥ 4, more effective way to evaluate the upper bound may need to be developed
and we would leave it for future research.
6.2 The Value of Integrated Decision Making
In this subsection, we investigate the value of coordinating pricing and empty repositioning
decisions in two sets of experiments with stationary and time-variant demands, respective. In
this subsection, the control policies and their performances are all computed under the state
discretization with all integer points.
Stationary Demand. We first focus on a short planning horizon (T = 4) with stationary
demand, to thoroughly explore how the cost and demand parameters influence the value of
coordinating decisions. We assume L = 1 such that our approximation is equivalent to the exact
model. The other parameters are set as follows. Let N = 40 and α = 1. Cost parameters are
time-invariant and identical for two ports: cf = 10, h = 4, b = 15, ce = 12. The inverse demand
function takes a linear form: Ai(λ) = ai − λ. We define ∆a = a1 − a2 to capture the degree of
potential demand imbalance. In the experiment, we will vary ∆a while fixing the total market
size a1+a2 = 80. Random noises ǫ
i
t are iid according to a truncated normal distribution N(0, σ)
13In computing the state transition, we chose the nearest point as the next-period state.
14Due to the complexity in computing upper bounds, the gap in each instance was estimated on a limited
number of sample paths. As such, the worst-case performance was largely influenced by unfavorable sample
paths.
15Recall that the original problem with L-period transit times has a state space of 2L + 1 dimensions. By
contrast, the dimension of the state space of our approximate model is always three, independent of the specific
value of L. We can therefore conclude that the computational time for our approximate model will be generally
invariant as L increases.
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over [−5, 5], where σ = 10. The initial state is set as x1 = 20 and d1 = (10, 20). As a benchmark,
suppose that the liner separates the management of empty containers and pricing decisions, and
set λi as λ
S
i for all i. Recall that λ
S denotes the maximizer of the net revenue R(λ). In each
period, the liner dynamically controls repositioning quantities while fixing λS . We compute the
resulting expected profit, denoted by JS where the superscript S denotes “separate” decision
making.
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Figure 7: The value of joint decision making
We then allow the decision maker to dynamically adjust λi within [λ
S
i −2, λ
S
i +2], coordinating
with the empty repositioning. The expected profit is represented by J∗. We quantify the value
of integrated decision making by the percentage of improvement, J
∗−JS
JS
. The percentage is
computed under different ∆a, N , c
e, b, σ. As shown in Figures 7a, 7b and 7c, the integrated
decision making brings greater value as potential demand imbalance ∆a increases. Moreover,
our results indicate that the value in coping with demand imbalance is amplified when the
liner owns fewer containers, when handling one additional empty container entails a higher cost
ce, or when the leasing rate for short-term containers b is higher. Nevertheless, the impact
of demand uncertainty is ambiguous and depends on the level of ∆a. It is often observed in
single-location inventory control problems that dynamic pricing yields greater improvement over
static pricing when the demand is more volatile (e.g., Federgruen and Heching, 1999). In our
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two-depot shipping system, however, this is only the case when ∆a is close to zero (see Figure
7d). Given a moderate demand imbalance (∆a = 6, 10), demand volatility in fact offsets the
benefit of dynamic pricing for balancing container flows. When demand imbalance is substantial
(∆a ≥ 14), the effect of dynamic pricing on mitigating flow imbalance will become dominant,
and demand volatility will then have little impact on profit improvement.
Time-variant Demand. We examine a long planning horizon T = 52 with two-period transit
times (L = 2) to explore the effects of discounting factor α and demand seasonality. One may
view it as an annual planning with 52 weeks. We assume that the market alternates between high
and low seasons, each season consisting of 13 periods. The inverse demand function in period t
is constructed as follows.
Ait(λ) =

 (1 + β)ai − λ if period t is in a high season(1− β)ai − λ if period t is in a low season
where the ai’s can be interpreted as the baseline market potential and β ∈ [0, 1] is a seasonal
factor. Let λSt = (λ
1S
t , λ
2S
t ) denote the maximizer of Rt(λ), which is time-dependent due to time-
variant demand. For integrated decision making, we assume that the adjustment range of λt is
proportional to the market potential. That is, [λit, λ¯
i
t] is set as [λ
iS
t − 2(1+β), λ
iS
t +2(1+β)] for
each high season and as [λiSt − 2(1− β), λ
iS
t +2(1−β)] for each low season. As in the stationary
demand setting above, we set N = 40 and scale down the demand and cost parameters to
accommodate two-period transit times: The baseline market potential is such that a1+ a2 = 40,
cf = 5 and h = 2. Random noises ǫit are iid according to U [−2, 2]. We fix b = 10, ∆a = 8
but varies ce ∈ {7, 6, 5}, α ∈ {1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4}, β ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. The initial state is set as in
the “equal” case described in Section 6.1. Despite the long planning horizon, our approximate
optimal control policy can be found in about 20 minutes.
Table 3: Effects of discounting factor (α) and demand seasonality (β) on the average value of
integrated decision making
α 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
J∗−JS
JS
(%) 34.2 37.7 49.7 55.4
β 0.1 0.2 0.3
J∗−JS
JS
(%) 37.1 47.1 48.5
Table 3 summarizes the average values of J
∗−JS
JS
in the tested instances with different α
and β, where J∗ and JS are the actual profits generated by our approximate optimal policy
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and the separate decision making, respectively.16 On average, our joint optimization model
generates greater value (relative to the separate decision making), as the discounting factor α
increases. Intuitively, a larger α places greater weights on future rewards and so our model,
whereby pricing decisions are forward-looking in consideration of future container allocation,
becomes more attractive. In addition, we observed that on average, the value of integrated
decision making tends to be higher as demand seasonality increases.
7 Extensions
7.1 Dependent Demand
Our analysis does not rely on the independence of ǫ1t and ǫ
2
t . In each period, the shipping demands
for both head-haul and back-haul voyages may have some dependent structure. For instance,
during a period of economic prosperity, shipping volumes would be large in both directions. Thus,
the results can readily be extended to the case where ǫ1t and ǫ
2
t are dependent. Furthermore, recall
that if a random vector X = (X1,X2) is smaller than another random vector Xˆ = (Xˆ1, Xˆ2) in
the supermodular order, written as X ≤sm Xˆ, then Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 are more positively dependent
than X1 and X2 (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007). Proposition 3 proves that when the random
noises in opposite directions are more positively dependent, the value of the profit-to-go function
(and hence the expected total profit) increases.
Proposition 3. For all t, if ǫt+1 ≤sm ǫˆt+1, i.e., the random vector ǫˆt+1 = (ǫˆ
1
t+1, ǫˆ
2
t+1) is larger
than ǫt+1 = (ǫ
1
t+1, ǫ
2
t+1) in the supermodular order, then J
A
t (vt; ǫt+1) ≤ J
A
t (vt; ǫˆt+1).
Intuitively, the positive dependence between the head-haul and back-haul demands reduces
the difficulty of balancing container flows to some degree, which enables the liner to obtain a
higher expected profit. In addition, demand may also be dependent over time. Our model can
be extended to incorporate this dependence by introducing Markov-modulated demand, a widely
used modeling technique in the inventory literature (see, e.g., Sethi and Cheng, 1997).
7.2 External Container Flows
In reality, a two-port system can be a sub-system of the entire shipping network operated by
an ocean liner. As a result, in addition to the container flows between the two ports, each port
may have external inbound or outbound container flows due to other shipping routes. We can
model the external flows as a Markov process ξt = (ξ
1
t , ξ
2
t ), where ξ
i
t denotes the number of
16We focus on the average value of J
∗
−JS
JS
here because J
∗
−JS
JS
may not be strictly monotone in α or β when
ce is fixed.
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containers arriving and being discharged at port i prior to the t-th voyage. Note that ξit can
also be negative, which indicates that some of empty containers are used (or reserved) for other
external service routes. The total number of containers in the two-port system is no longer fixed
in the presence of external container flows. Let Nt denote the total number of containers in
period t. The approximate DP model can then be adapted to the following:
JAt (xt,dt, ξt, Nt) = max
λit+1∈[λ
i
t+1,λ¯
i
t+1],u
i
t≥0
{αRt+1(λt+1)− c
e
t · (u
1
t + u
2
t )
− Gˆ1t (xt − u
1
t − d
1
t )− Gˆ
2
t (Nt − xt − u
2
t − d
2
t ) + αE[J
A
t+1(xt+1,dt+1, ξt+1, Nt+1)|ξt]},
(20)
where
xt+1 = xt − u
1
t − d
1
t + u
2
t + d
2
t + ξ
1
t+1, (21)
Nt+1 = Nt + ξ
1
t+1 + ξ
2
t+1. (22)
For any fixed (ξt, Nt), we can apply the same state transformation technique as before. By
similar arguments, it can be shown that JAt (vt, ξt, Nt) is L
♮-concave in vt for any fixed (ξt, Nt).
Therefore, the structural properties of the approximate optimal policy still hold when there are
external container flows entering or leaving the two-port system. Finally, we note that when
the ξt’s are intertemporally independent, the additional state variables can be reduced from the
triplet (ξt, Nt) to a single variable Nt.
7.3 Inland Transportation Time
Our model has ignored the distance between the deep-sea terminal and inland customers,
and so containers can be immediately used to satisfy the next-period demand upon arrival.
In reality, after arriving at a deep-sea terminal, it may take some time for containers to be
transferred to inland customers for unloading/loading. To some extent, our framework can be
adapted to incorporate the inland transportation time by expanding the transit time. Let us
assume that after arrival, it takes one period for each container to be transported to inland
depots, unloaded/loaded at nearby customer sites and sent back for another voyage. If the
inland transportation time is more than one period, the treatment is analogous.17 We can
introduce a dummy “in-transit” location before each voyage ends in our model, as illustrated by
17We note that the inland transportation time can be different for empty and laden containers, as a laden
container spends extra time to be discharged at the receiver’s place before going for new export cargoes. However,
this extra time would be small enough (i.e., less than one period) if the inland transport is well coordinated such
that an unloaded container need not travel too far for new cargoes. Hence, we do not distinguish empty and laden
containers in accounting the hinterland transportation time.
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Inland Depots
Inland Depots
Figure 8: Dynamics of inventory levels
the dotted circles in Figure 8. Each dummy location can represent multiple inland container
depots in close proximity to customers. Consequently, containers arriving in period t can only
be exported (or returned if they are leased) in period t + 2 after unloaded and/or loaded at
customer sites.This adaptation expands the transit time from L to L + 1 periods, and so the
proposed approximate model and our analytical results remain valid. However, in doing so, we
have assumed that the distance between the deep-sea terminal and each inland depot is similar
and that the inland transport is well coordinated. If these assumptions are not satisfied, more
sophisticated models and analyses are needed and we leave this for future research.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we develop a stochastic DP model that integrates pricing decisions with empty
container management. The exact DP is intractable due to its high-dimensional state space.
Thus, we propose a novel approximation approach whereby the state dimension is reduced to
three. Using the properties of L♮-concavity, we characterize the structure of the approximate
control policy. An upper bound of the exact DP can be obtained by solving the information
relaxation-based dual of the exact DP. Using this upper bound, we numerically show that the
control policies generated by our approximate model perform close to optimal when transit times
span multiple periods.
Our work has limitations. First, we have restricted to the shipping services with two ports or
two regions. In reality, a shipping route may involve more than two ports, which would make the
problem more challenging to solve. Since the two-port model studied in this paper has captured
the key features of managing empty containers in a cyclic shipping route, we conjecture that our
approximation approach can be generalized to more complicated networks with more than two
ports. However, characterizing the structural properties would be far more involved. Second, the
ocean shipping industry is a competitive market, whereas we only considered a single liner that
monopolizes market prices. While Zhou and Lee (2009) and Chen et al. (2016) have developed
stylized deterministic models to study the competition between ocean liners, it remains an open
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problem to characterize the market equilibrium with uncertain demand.
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Appendices
A L♮-Concavity
Definition 1 (L♮-Concavity). Let V be a closed convex sublattice of Rn. A function f : V → R
is L♮-concave if the function ψ(v, ζ) = f(v − ζe) where ζ ≥ 0 is supermodular on {(v, ζ) : v ∈
V, ζ ∈ R+,v − ζe ∈ V}.
Lemma A.1 (Pang et al. (2012)). (i) If f(v) is L♮-concave, so is ψ(v, ζ) = f(v − ζe). (ii)
If g(v, ζ) is L♮-concave, so is f(v) = maxζ≥0{g(v, ζ)}. (iii) If g(v, ζ) is L
♮-concave, and ζ(v)
denotes the smallest value of ζ ≥ 0 that maximizes g(v, ζ), then ζ(v) is nondecreasing in v but
ζ(v+ ωe) ≤ ζ(v) + ω for ω > 0.
In addition, like supermodularity, L♮-concavity is preserved under positive linear combination
and expectation. Basically, L♮-concavity implies ordinary concavity and supermodularity. As for
L♮-convexity, one can find its properties and applications in inventory problems in Zipkin (2008)
and Huh and Janakiraman (2010). For more discussions on these concepts, we refer interested
readers to Murota (2009) and the literature therein. The following lemma is simple, but will be
used frequently in the analysis in this paper.
Lemma A.2. Let f(x) : R → R be a single variable concave function and (y, z) be a vector from
a sublattice of R2. Then, f(y − z) is L♮-concave in (y, z).
Proof. By definition, it suffices to show that ψ(y, z, ζ) = f [(y − ζ) − (z − ζ)] = f(y − z) is
supermodular in (y, z, ζ). It follows from Lemma 2.6.2(b) in Topkis (1998) that f(y − z) is
indeed supermodular in (y, z).
B Supplementary Numerical Results
B.1 Comparison between Penalized and Non-penalized Upper Bounds
For each instance in the numerical experiments reported in Section 6.1, we computed the upper
bound with zero penalty (i.e., πt = 0). Table 3 presented a comparison between the bounds with
and without the penalty term. On average, imposing a penalty function improves the upper
bound. Since the bounds were estimated on only a few simulated sample paths, the zero-penalty
bound could be tighter in some instances.
B.2 Impact of the Approximate State Space
We refer to the further discretized state space (i.e., the one containing 20 and 5 discrete values for
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Table 4: Penalized Upper Bounds JUB1 versus Non-penalized Upper Bounds J
UB0
1
T N
Initial (JUB1 − J
UB0
1 )/J
UB0
1 (%)
State Average Median Max
L=2 5 25 Equal 0.00 -0.01 0.25
Unequal -0.03 -0.03 0.10
5 30 Equal 0.20 0.19 0.43
Unequal 0.24 0.24 0.47
5 35 Equal 0.33 0.31 0.64
Unequal 0.28 0.26 0.56
6 25 Equal -0.03 -0.01 0.04
Unequal 0.00 -0.03 0.75
6 30 Equal 0.06 0.06 0.22
Unequal 0.17 0.15 0.35
6 35 Equal 0.17 0.14 0.40
Unequal 0.25 0.25 0.43
L=3 5 30 Equal 0.12 0.42 1.62
Unequal 0.33 0.55 1.41
5 35 Equal 0.39 0.55 1.18
Unequal 0.46 0.60 1.14
5 40 Equal 0.37 0.35 0.78
Unequal 0.54 0.57 1.42
6 30 Equal 0.25 0.71 1.81
Unequal 0.33 0.66 1.50
6 35 Equal 0.27 0.29 1.00
Unequal 0.32 0.38 1.03
6 40 Equal 0.25 0.29 0.66
Unequal 0.34 0.36 1.20
the inventory level and in-transit containers on each vessel, respectively) as the “approximate"
state space, as opposed to the all-integer state space (i.e., the one that contains all possible
integer points). We focus on the case of L = 2 such that the upper bound is computable within
a reasonable time. In the experiments, we varied T , N , a1 − a2 and the initial state while fixing
b = 0.6, ce = 0.4 and the other parameters the same as in Section 6.1. For each instance and under
each discretization scheme, we computed the approximate optimal policy, and the profit when
the policy is implemented in the all-integer state space, and the optimal gap estimated under
the corresponding discretization scheme. Table 5 compares the performances and computational
times of the control policies computed under different state-space discretization schemes, and
Table 6 shows the impact of different state-space discretizations on the estimation of optimality
gaps.18
18In Table 5, we use JApprox to denote the profit when the solution obtained in the further discretized state
space is implemented in the all-integer state space, and JAll−Int to denote the profit when the solution is obtained
and also implemented in the all-integer state space as a benchmark. In Table 6, the “Time” columns report the
computational time for estimating the upper bounds on five randomly generated sample path.
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Table 5: Impact of the approximate state space on the solution quality
N a1 − a2 Initial State
Approx. All-Integer
JApprox
JAll−Int
(%)
Profit JApprox Time (s) Profit JAll−Int Time (s)
25 2 Equal 457.90 9.42 458.54 18.84 99.86
Unequal 451.36 9.42 453.70 18.89 99.48
25 6 Equal 468.82 9.37 470.73 18.75 99.59
Unequal 461.95 9.38 465.93 18.78 99.15
30 2 Equal 465.01 10.25 465.31 24.89 99.94
Unequal 457.77 10.31 458.13 25.04 99.92
30 6 Equal 478.07 10.23 482.16 24.80 99.15
Unequal 472.05 10.23 476.14 24.93 99.14
35 2 Equal 468.09 10.99 468.62 30.69 99.89
Unequal 459.76 10.99 461.08 30.67 99.71
35 6 Equal 486.13 10.98 486.47 30.65 99.93
Unequal 476.60 11.02 477.86 30.63 99.74
Table 6: Impact of the approximate state space on the estimation of optimality gaps
N a1 − a2
Initial Approx. All-Integer
State Opt. Gap (%) Time (s) Opt. Gap (%) Time (s)
25 2 Equal 0.79 1068.6 0.33 12167.7
Unequal 1.18 1070.8 0.40 12160.9
25 6 Equal 3.24 903.3 2.27 11890.4
Unequal 3.40 897.6 2.29 11880.4
30 2 Equal 1.56 1601.0 0.33 34621.5
Unequal 2.02 1599.0 0.62 34563.8
30 6 Equal 2.25 1408.9 1.26 34819.2
Unequal 2.60 1409.6 1.42 34815.6
35 2 Equal 0.32 1985.3 0.00 61765.0
Unequal 1.02 1980.1 0.46 61409.6
35 6 Equal 1.64 1784.0 0.91 62274.9
Unequal 2.20 1782.3 0.08 62322.6
Average: 1.85 1457.5 0.86 36224.3
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C Technical Lemma
Lemma C.1. For t = 1, 2, ..., T , fAt is jointly concave, and has a finite maximizer (u
∗
t ,λ
∗
t+1).
Moreover, u1∗t u
2∗
t = 0.
Proof of Lemma C.1. Clearly, JAT+1 is jointly concave as Gˆ
i
T+1 is convex for all i by definition.
Then, it is straightforward to inductively argue that fAt is jointly concave: If J
A
t+1 is jointly
concave, so is JAt . This follows since for all t, the feasible region for (ut,λt+1) is a convex set,
and the concavity is preserved under maximization over a convex set by Theorem A.4 in Porteus
(2002).
We first argue that at most one of u1t and u
2
t is nonzero. Suppose in the optimal solution
we have u1t ≥ u
2
t > 0. Let ∆ = u
1
t − u
2
t . With a fixed λt+1, let uˆ
1
t = ∆ and uˆ
2
t = 0. In view
of (10), xt+1 remains the same with the solution uˆt, and so does EJ
A
t+1(xt+1,dt+1). However,
by Assumption 3, the cost terms in (9) are reduced at least by (2cet − h
1
t − h
2
t )u
2
t > 0. This
contradicts the optimality of (u1t , u
2
t ).
To establish the existence of the finite maximizer, we show that given any feasible λt+1 and
ujt = 0, limuit→∞ f
A
t (ut,λt+1, xt,dt) = −∞. First, note that J
A
T+1(x,d) → −∞ as |x| → ∞.
By induction, if lim|x|→∞ J
A
t+1(x,d) = −∞, we have lim|x|→∞ J
A
t (x,d) = −∞. Now, for all t
and any given state (xt,d), as one of u
i
t goes to ∞, we have three terms in f
A
t (ut,λt+1, xt,dt)
tending to negative infinity while the other two are finite. Hence, for any fixed λt+1, f
A
t → −∞
as either u1t or u
2
t goes to infinity. Together with the concavity, this implies u
∗
t is finite.
D Proofs of Main Results
Proof of Lemma 1. In view of Lemma A.2, it is easy to verify the L♮-concavity of JAT+1(v).
By induction, we need to show that if JAt+1(v) is L
♮-concave in v, so is JAt (v).
First, consider the problem (13). If JAt+1(v) is L
♮-concave, so is JAt+1[(0, y
1
t , y
3
t + ǫ
2
t+1)
T −
(λ1t+1 + ǫ
1
t+1)e]} in (y
1
t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1) for any realization of ǫ
i
t+1, where we have invoked Lemma
A.1(i). Hence, EJAt+1[(0, y
1
t , y
3
t + ǫ
2
t+1)
T − (λ1t+1 + ǫ
1
t+1)e]} is also L
♮-concave in (y1t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1).
This implies the joint concavity in (y1t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1). By Assumption 2, Rt+1(λ
1
t+1, y
3
t − y
1
t ) is also
jointly concave in (y1t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1), as the composition of affine functions preserves the concavity.
The set {(y1t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1) : (y
3
t , λ
1
t+1) ∈ A(y
1
t )} is convex. By Theorem A.4 in Porteus (2002), Ht(y
1
t )
is simply a single-variable concave function.
Next, we consider the problem (15). By definition, it then suffices to show that JAt (vt − ζe)
is supermodular in (vt, ζ) for ζ ≥ 0. To this end, we first perform the maximization over ut:
JAt (vt) = max
y2t≥v
3
t
{Wt(y
2
t , v
2
t )− c
e
ty
2
t − Gˆ
2
t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t )} + c
e
tv
3
t , where Wt(y
2
t , v
2
t ) = max
u1t≥0
{Ht(y
2
t −
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u1t ) − c
e
tu
1
t − Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t )} − c
e
ty
2
t − Gˆ
2
t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t ). We claim that Wt(y
2
t , v
2
t ) is L
♮-concave.
In view of Lemma A.1(ii), it suffices to show that the function inside the maximization is L♮-
concave. By Lemma A.2, Ht(y
2
t − u
1
t ) and −Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t ) are L
♮-concave in (u1t , y
2
t ) and (u
1
t , v
2
t ),
respectively. Therefore, Ht(y
2
t − u
1
t )− c
e
tu
1
t − Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t ) is L
♮-concave in (u1t , y
2
t , v
2
t ), and so is
Wt(y
2
t , v
2
t ) in (y
2
t , v
2
t ).
Now, we examine the supermodularity of JAt (vt − ζe).
JAt (vt − ζe) = max
y2t≥v
3
t−ζ
{Wt(y
2
t , v
2
t − ζ)− c
e
ty
2
t − Gˆ
2
t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t − ζ)}+ c
e
t (v
3
t − ζ)
= max
yˆ2t≥v
3
t
{Wt(yˆ
2
t − ζ, v
2
t − ζ)− c
e
t yˆ
2
t − Gˆ
2
t (N − yˆ
2
t + v
1
t )}+ c
e
tv
3
t ,
where we set yˆ2t = y
2
t+ζ in the last equality. Due to the L
♮-concavity ofWt(y
2
t , v
2
t ),Wt(yˆ
2
t−ζ, v
2
t−
ζ) is supermodular in (yˆ2t , v
2
t , ζ). Lemma A.2 implies that −Gˆ
2
t (N − yˆ
2
t + v
1
t ) is supermodular
in (yˆ2t , v
1
t ). Moreover, {(yˆ
2
t ,v, ζ) : yˆ
2
t ≥ v
3
t ,v ∈ V, ζ ≥ 0} forms a lattice. By Theorem 2.7.6 in
Topkis (1998), JAt (vt − ζe) is supermodular in (vt, ζ).
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the problem (13). Recall that Rt+1 is defined as two sep-
arable concave functions. By Lemma A.2, the first term Rt+1(λ
1
t+1, y
3
t − y
1
t ) is hence L
♮-
concave in (y1t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1). By Lemma A.1(i) and Lemma 1, it follows that the second term
EJAt+1[(0, y
1
t , y
3
t + ǫ
2
t+1)
T − (λ1t+1 + ǫ
1
t+1)e] is also L
♮-concave in (y1t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1). Therefore, the
objective function of problem (13) is L♮-concave.
From Lemma A.1(iii), the optimal choice of λ1∗t+1 for any fixed y
3
t satisfies that λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t , y
3
t )
is increasing in (y1t , y
3
t ) and
0 ≤ λ1∗t+1(y
1
t + ω, y
3
t + ω)− λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t , y
3
t ) ≤ ω. (23)
On the other hand, as the constraint set is lattice and L♮-concavity is preserved under max-
imization, the objective function after optimizing over λ1t+1 is L
♮-concave in (y1t , y
3
t ). For the
optimal choice of y3∗t , Lemma A.1(iii) implies
0 ≤ y3∗t (y
1
t + ω)− y
3∗
t (y
1
t ) ≤ ω. (24)
By definition, y3∗t (y
1
t ) = y
1
t + λ
2∗
t+1(y
1
t ). Thus, the inequality translates to
−ω ≤ λ2∗t+1(y
1
t + ω)− λ
2∗
t+1(y
1
t ) ≤ 0.
Now consider the optimal choice of λ1∗t+1(y
1
t ) = λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t , y
3∗
t (y
1
t )). By the monotonicity of
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λ1∗t+1(y
1
t , y
3
t ) and (24), it follows that
λ1∗t+1(y
1
t + ω) = λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t + ω, y
3∗
t (y
1
t + ω)) ≥ λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t , y
3∗
t (y
1
t )) = λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t ).
Likewise,
λ1∗t+1(y
1
t + ω)− λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t ) =λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t + ω, y
3∗
t (y
1
t + ω))− λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t , y
3∗
t (y
1
t ))
≤λ1∗t+1(y
1
t + ω, y
3∗
t (y
1
t ) + ω)− λ
1∗
t+1(y
1
t , y
3∗
t (y
1
t )) ≤ ω,
where the first inequality follows by (24) and the monotonicity of λ1∗t+1(y
1
t , y
3
t ), and the second
equality follows by (23).
As pit+1 is one-to-one mapped from λ
i
t+1, the sensitivities of p
i
t+1 immediately follow.
Proof of Theorem 2. The problem (15) can be recast as
JAt (vt) = max
u1t≥0
{H˜t(v
1
t , v
3
t , u
1
t )− c
e
tu
1
t − Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t )}+ c
e
tv
3
t , (25)
where H˜t(v
1
t , v
3
t , u
1
t ) = maxy2t≥v3t {Ht(y
2
t − u
1
t ) − c
e
ty
2
t − Gˆ
2
t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t )}. Note that H˜t is
L♮-concave in (v1t , v
3
t , u
1
t ). This can be verified as follows:
H˜t[(v
1
t , v
3
t , u
1
t )
T − ζe] = max
y2t≥v
3
t−ζ
{H(y2t − u
1
t + ζ)− c
e
ty
2
t − Gˆ
2
t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t − ζ)}
= max
yˆ2t≥v
3
t
{H(yˆ2t − u
1
t )− c
e
t yˆ
2
t − Gˆ
2
t (N − yˆ
2
t + v
1
t )}+ c
e
tζ,
where the last inequality follows by setting yˆ2t = y
2
t + ζ. The objective is supermodular in
(yˆ2t , v
1
t , v
3
t , u
1
t , ζ) and the feasible region is a lattice. Hence, H˜t[(v
1
t , v
3
t , u
1
t )
T −ζe] is supermodular
in (v1t , v
3
t , u
1
t , ζ).
Therefore, the objective function of problem (25) is L♮-concave in (u1t , v
1
t , v
2
t , v
3
t ). From
Lemma A.1(iii), u1∗t (vt) is nondecreasing in vt and 0 ≤ u
1∗
t (vt + ωe) − u
1∗
t (vt) ≤ ω. Trans-
lating 0 ≤ u1∗t (vt + ωe) − u
1∗
t (vt) ≤ ω with the original state vector, we have u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t −
ω, d2t )− u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) ≤ ω. In addition, as u
1∗
t (v) is nondecreasing, we have u
1∗
t (vt) ≤ u
1∗
t (vt +
(0, 0, ω)T ) ≤ u1∗t (vt+(0, ω, ω)
T ) ≤ u1∗t (vt+ωe). This translates to u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) ≤ u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t+
ω) ≤ u1∗t (xt + ω, d
1
t , d
2
t ) ≤ u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t − ω, d
2
t ), which leads to the first three inequalities in part
(i).
Assuming u2∗t = 0, we have y
2
t = v
3
t in the problem (15). The problem then becomes
JAt (vt) = max
u1t≥0
{Ht(v
3
t − u
1
t )− c
e
tu
1
t − Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t )} − Gˆ
2
t (N − v
3
t + v
1
t ). (26)
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The optimal choice of u1t only depends on v
2
t and v
3
t , and the objective function is L
♮-concave in
(v2t , v
3
t ). From Lemma A.1(iii), it immediately follows that for ω > 0,
0 ≤ u1∗t (v
2
t + ω, v
3
t + ω)− u
1∗
t (v
2
t , v
3
t ) ≤ ω.
The inequalities translate to 0 ≤ u1∗t (xt + ω, d
1
t , d
2
t ) − u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) = u
1∗
t (xt, d
1
t − ω, d
2
t ) −
u1∗t (xt, d
1
t , d
2
t ) ≤ ω. It can be seen that a one-unit increase in xt has the same effect u
1∗
t as a
one-unit decrease in d1t , and u
1∗
t will remain unchanged if xt and d
1
t vary by the same amount.
Proof of Theorem 3. Step 1. We first show the following lemma which establishes the differ-
entiability of Ht(x).
Lemma D.1. Ht(x) is continuously differentiable for all t.
Proof of Lemma D.1. First, we have established that Ht(x) is a concave function. It is known
that if a finite function is convex and differentiable, it is also continuously differentiable (see,
for example, Section 25 in Rockafellar, 1970). Hence, we only need to show that Ht(x) is
differentiable.
Now consider problem (13). By the envelop theorem, the derivative of Ht(y
1
t ) exists as long as
∂EJAt+1[(0,y
1
t ,y
3
t+ǫ
2
t+1)
T−(λ1t+1+ǫ
1
t+1)e]
∂y1t
is well defined (because
∂Rt+1(λ1t+1,y
3
t−y
1
t )
∂y1t
exists by Assumption
2 and the relevant constraint is linear and hence differentiable in y1t ).
To show the differentiability of EJAt+1 in v
2
t+1, we will use the following result from Zhu and
Thonemann (2009) (see Claim 4 in their proof of Lemma 1): For continuous functions f(x) and
φ(x), if f(x) is continuously differentiable except on a finite set of points, and the derivative,
whenever it exists, is bounded, then
∫
f(x− ǫ)φ(ǫ)dǫ is continuously differentiable. This result
basically implies that even when f(x) is not differentiable at a finite number of points, the
expectation of f(x − ǫ) over ǫ is differentiable as long as f(x) has a bounded derivative at
differentiable points.
Applying this result, it then remains to show that JAt+1(vt+1) is differentiable in v
2
t+1 except
on a finite set of points and its derivative, if it exists, is bounded. This holds for JAT+1, as
JAT+1 is differentiable in v
2
T+1 except at v
2
T+1 = 0 and |
∂JAT+1(vT+1)
∂v2T+1
| ≤ max{h1T+1, b
1
T+1} for
v2T+1 6= 0. For t = 1, 2..., T , applying the envelop theorem in the DP recursion (11), we find that
the derivative of JAt (vt) with respective to v
2
t only depends on the term −Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1∗
t ). Thus,
JAt (vt) is differentiable in v
2
t except at v
2
t = u
1∗
t , and |
∂JAt (vt)
∂v2t
| ≤ max{h1t , b
1
t } for v
2
t 6= u
1∗
t . That
is, for all t, JAt (v) is differentiable in v
2
t except on a finite set of points.
Step 2. We show that according to the repositioning direction, the state space can be divided
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into four segments Ωi, as defined in the main text and illustrated in Figure 4.
By Assumption 4, it clearly follows that u∗t = 0 if d
1
t ≥ xt and d
2
t ≥ N −xt; u
∗
t ≥ 0 if d
1
t < xt
and d2t ≥ N − xt; u
∗
t ≤ 0 if d
1
t ≥ xt and d
2
t < N − xt. In the above three cases, the repositioning
direction is simply due to the capacity constraint.
We proceed to scrutinize the remaining case where d1t < xt and d
2
t < N−xt. By the concavity
of problem (16) and Lemma D.1, it is optimal to reposition nothing if and only if
−H ′t(v
3
t ) ∈ ∂uWt(0,vt), (27)
where −H ′t(v
3
t ) is the derivative of Ht(v
3
t − ut) with respect to ut at ut = 0 and ∂uWt(0,vt)
represents the subgradient of Wt with respect to ut at ut = 0. In fact, equation (27) is just
the first-order optimality condition for u∗t = 0. When d
1
t < xt and d
2
t < N − xt, the slope of
each piece of Wt(ut,vt) is illustrated in Figure 9. Hence, ∂uWt(0,vt) is given by the interval
[−cet + h
2
t , c
e
t − h
1
t ], and the optimality condition translates to u
∗
t = 0 if and only if −c
e
t + h
1
t ≤
H ′t(v
3
t ) ≤ c
e
t − h
2
t . Recall that H
′
t(v) is nonincreasing by concavity. We can define vt as the
smallest v such that H ′t(v) ≤ c
e
t − h
2
t , and v¯t as the largest v such that H
′
t(v) ≥ −c
e
t + h
1
t ,
where vt ≤ v¯t.
19 By the concavity and optimality condition (27), it follows that u∗t = 0 when
vt ≤ v
3
t ≤ v¯t; u
∗
t ≥ 0 when v
3
t > v¯t; and u
∗
t ≤ 0 when v
3
t < vt. That is, when d
1
t < xt and
d2t < N − xt, the repositioning direction depends on the value of v
3
t = xt − d
1
t + d
2
t , and two
thresholds v¯t and vt.
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Figure 9: The slopes of Wt(ut,vt) with respect to ut
Step 3. Having determined the sign of u∗t in each state segment, we are ready to pin down
the specific policies in Ωi.
For segments Ω1 and Ω4, we have shown that the net repositioning quantity u
∗
t = 0. There-
fore, the end-of-voyage inventory position is simply equal to xt − d
1
t + d
2
t . From Theorem 1, the
optimal prices depends only on xt − d
1
t + d
2
t , written as pt+1(xt − d
1
t + d
2
t ).
19For ease of exposition, in this definition we allow v¯t and vt to take infinite values. For instance, vt = −∞
(resp. +∞) when H ′t(v) ≤ c
e
t − h
2
t (resp. H
′
t(v) > c
e
t − h
2
t ) for all v.
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Now we consider Ω2, where the net repositioning quantity u
∗
t ≥ 0. In view of problem (16) and
Assumption 4, the optimal choice of ut is in effect determined by max 0 ≤ ut ≤ xt − d
1
t {Ht(v
3
t −
ut)− (c
e
t − h
1
t )ut}, where we have omitted constant terms in the objective function of (16). Let
y = v3t − ut, denoting the target inventory position. The problem is further reduced to
max
d2t≤y≤v
3
t
{Ht(y) + (c
e
t − h
1
t )y} − (c
e
t − h
1
t )v
3
t .
Let s∗Ot be the (smallest) solution such that H
′
t(s
∗
Ot) = −c
e
t +h
1
t , i.e., s
∗
Ot is the maximizer to the
unconstrained problem maxy{Ht(y) + (c
e
t − h
1
t )y}. Therefore, we have three subcases in Ω2:
Subcase 1: v3t ≤ v¯t. As v¯t is the largest value of y such that H
′
t(y) ≥ −c
e
t + h
1
t , by the
concavity of Ht, we have H
′
t(v
3
t ) ≥ −c
e
t + h
1
t , which implies s
∗
Ot ≥ v
3
t . Therefore, the optimal
solution is attained at the upper bound of y, i.e, y∗ = v3t .
Subcase 2: v3t > v¯t and d
2
t < s
∗
Ot. Similar to Subcase 1, for v
3
t > v¯t, we have s
∗
Ot < v
3
t .
Together with d2t < s
∗
Ot, the interior optimum is attained: y
∗ = s∗Ot. That is, u
∗
t = v
3
t − s
∗
Ot.
Subcase 3: v3t > v¯t and d
2
t ≥ s
∗
Ot. The optimal solution is attained at the lower bound of y,
i.e, y∗ = d2t . That is, u
∗
t = v
3
t − d
2
t = xt − d
1
t .
The analysis in Ω3 is analogous. As ut ≤ 0, the optimal choice of ut is essentially determined
by max−(N−xt−d2t )≤ut≤0{Ht(v
3
t − ut) + (c
e
t − h
2
t )ut}. Replacing ut with y = v
3
t − ut leads to
max
v3t≤y≤N−d
1
t
{Ht(y)− (c
e
t − h
2
t )y}+ (c
e
t − h
2
t )v
3
t .
Let s∗It denote the (smallest) maximizer to the unconstrained problem maxy{Ht(y) − (c
e
t −
h2t )y}. We have H
′
t(s
∗
It) = (c
e
t − h
2
t ). Three subcases need to be considered.
Subcase 1: v3t ≥ vt. As vt is the smallest value of y such that H
′
t(y) ≤ c
e
t −h
2
t , by concavity
of Ht, we have H
′
t(v
3
t ) ≤ c
e
t − h
2
t , which implies s
∗
Ot ≤ v
3
t . Therefore, the optimal solution is
attained at y∗ = v3t , namely, u
∗
t = 0.
Subcase 2: v3t < vt and N − d
1
t > s
∗
It. Similar to the discussion in Subcase 1, for v
3
t < vt,
we have s∗Ot > v
3
t . Together with N −d
1
t ≥ s
∗
Ot, the interior optimum is attained: y
∗ = s∗It. That
is, u∗t = v
3
t − s
∗
It.
Subcase 3: v3t > vt and N − d
1
t ≤ s
∗
It. The optimal solution is attained at y
∗ = N − d1t .
That is, u∗t = v
3
t − (N − d
1
t ) = −(N − xt − d
2
t ).
The corresponding pricing decisions are determined by the values of y∗.
Proof of Proposition 1. As defined in the proof of Theorem 3, s∗Ot and s
∗
It are the solutions
to unconstrained problems maxy{Ht(y)+(c
e
t −h
1
t )y} and maxy{Ht(y)−(c
e
t −h
2
t )y}. This implies
that H ′t(s
∗
Ot) ≤ H
′
t(s
∗
It). Hence, s
∗
Ot ≥ s
∗
It by the concavity of Ht.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The proposition follows immediately from the concavity of Ht and
the first-order optimality conditions: Ht(s
∗
Ot) + (c
e
t − h
1
t ) = 0 and Ht(s
∗
It)− (c
e
t − h
2
t ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. As we know, if two n-dimensional random vectors X and Y satisfy
X ≤sm Y, then E[ψ(X)] ≤ E[ψ(Y)] for any supermodular function ψ : R
n → R. Recall that the
transformed DP recursion is given by
JAt (vt; ǫt+1) = max
(u1t ,y
1
t ,y
2
t ,y
3
t ,λ
1
t+1)∈A
{αRt+1(λ
1
t+1, y
3
t − y
1
t )− c
e
t (u
1
t + y
2
t )− Gˆ
1
t (v
2
t − u
1
t )
− Gˆ2t (N − y
2
t + v
1
t ) + αEJ
A
t+1((0, y
1
t , y
3
t + ǫ
2
t+1)
T − (λ1t+1 + ǫ
1
t+1)e) + c
e
tv
3
t .
For any fixed (u1t , y
1
t , y
2
t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1), J
A
t+1 is supermodular in any realization of ǫt+1. This
follows by the L♮-concavity of JAt+1 (from Lemma 1). Then we can write J
A
t (vt; ǫt+1) as
JAt (vt; ǫt+1) = E[ψ(u
1∗
t , y
1∗
t , y
2∗
t , y
3∗
t , λ
1
t+1,vt; ǫt+1)],
where the superscript ∗ indicates the optimal solution given ǫt+1. It follows that
JAt (vt; ǫt+1) = E[ψ(u
1∗
t , y
1∗
t , y
2∗
t , y
3∗
t , λ
1∗
t+1,vt; ǫt+1)]
≤ E[ψ(u1∗t , y
1∗
t , y
2∗
t , y
3∗
t , λ
1∗
t+1,vt; ǫˆt+1)]
≤ max
(u1t ,y
1
t ,y
2
t ,y
3
t ,λ
1
t+1)∈A
E[ψ(u1t , y
1
t , y
2
t , y
3
t , λ
1
t+1,vt; ǫˆt+1)] = J
A
t (vt; ǫˆt+1)
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